This document describes methods for handling Unicode strings representing usernames and passwords. This document obsoletes RFC 4013.
Introduction
Usernames and passwords are widely used for authentication and authorization on the Internet, either directly when provided in plaintext (as in the SASL PLAIN mechanism [RFC4616] or the HTTP Basic scheme [RFC2617] ) or indirectly when provided as the input to a cryptographic algorithm such as a hash function (as in the SASL SCRAM mechanism [RFC5802] or the HTTP Digest scheme [RFC2617] ). To increase the likelihood that the input and comparison of usernames and passwords will work in ways that make sense for typical users throughout the world, this document defines rules for preparing and comparing internationalized strings that represent usernames and passwords.
The methods specified in this document define two PRECIS profiles as explained in the PRECIS framework specification [I-D.ietf-precis-framework]. This document assumes that all strings are comprised of characters from the Unicode character set [UNICODE] , with special attention to characters outside the ASCII range [RFC20] . The methods defined here might be applicable wherever usernames or passwords are used. However, the methods are not intended for use in preparing strings that are not usernames (e.g., email addresses and LDAP distinguished names), nor in cases where identifiers or secrets are not strings (e.g., keys and certificates) or require specialized handling.
This document obsoletes RFC 4013 (the "SASLprep" profile of stringprep [RFC3454] ) but can be used by technologies other than the Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) [RFC4422] , such as HTTP authentication [RFC2617] .
What the Username and Password Profiles Provide
Profiles of the PRECIS framework enable software to handle Unicode characters outside the ASCII range in an automated way, so that such characters are treated carefully and consistently in application protocols. In large measure, these profiles are designed to protect application developers from the potentially negative consequences of supporting the full range of Unicode characters. For instance, in almost all application protocols it would be dangerous to treat the Unicode character SUPERSCRIPT ONE (U+0089) as equivalent to DIGIT ONE (U+0031), since that would result in false positives during comparison, authentication, and authorization (e.g., an attacker could easy spoof an account "user1@example.com"). The term "non-ASCII space" refers to any Unicode code point having a general category of "Zs", with the exception of U+0020 (here called "ASCII space").
As used here, the term "password" is not literally limited to a word; i.e., a password could be a passphrase consisting of more than one word, perhaps separated by spaces or other such characters.
Some SASL mechanisms (e.g., CRAM-MD5, DIGEST-MD5, and SCRAM) specify that the authentication identity used in the context of such mechanisms is a "simple user name" (see Section 2 of [RFC4422] as well as [RFC4013] ). Various application technologies also assume that the identity of a user or account takes the form of a username (e.g., authentication for the HyperText Transfer Protocol [RFC2617]), whether or not they use SASL. Note well that the exact form of a username in any particular SASL mechanism or application technology is a matter for implementation and deployment, and that a username does not necessarily map to any particular application identifier (such as the localpart of an email address).
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] .
Usernames

Definition
This document specifies that a username is a string of Unicode code points [UNICODE], encoded using UTF-8 [RFC3629] , and structured either as an ordered sequence of "userparts" (where the complete username can consist of a single userpart or a space-separated sequence of userparts) or as a userpart@domainpart (where the domainpart is an IP literal, an IPv4 address, or a fully-qualified domain name). The syntax for a username is defined as follows using the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) [RFC5234] . username = userpart [1*(1*SP userpart)] / userpart '@' domainpart userpart = 1*(idpoint) ; ; an "idpoint" is a UTF-8 encoded Unicode code point ; that conforms to the PRECIS "IdentifierClass" ; domainpart = IP-literal / IPv4address / ifqdn ; ; the "IPv4address" and "IP-literal" rules are ; defined in RFC 3986, and the first-match-wins ; (a.k.a. "greedy") algorithm described in RFC 3986 ; applies ;
Saint
; reuse of the IP-literal rule from RFC 3986 implies ; that IPv6 addresses are enclosed in square brackets ; (i.e., beginning with '[' and ending with ']') ; ifqdn = 1*1023(domainpoint) ; ; a "domainpoint" is a UTF-8 encoded Unicode code ; point that conforms to RFC 5890 ;
All code points and blocks not explicitly allowed in the PRECIS IdentifierClass are disallowed; this includes private use characters, surrogate code points, and the other code points and blocks that were defined as "Prohibited Output" in [RFC4013] . In addition, common constructions such as "user@example.com" are allowed as usernames under this specification, as they were under [RFC4013] .
Preparation
Each userpart of a username MUST conform to the "UsernameIdentifierClass" profile of the PRECIS IdentifierClass, which is defined as follows:
1. The base string class is the "IdentifierClass" specified in [I-D.ietf-precis-framework]. 2. Fullwidth and halfwidth characters MUST be mapped to their decomposition equivalents. 3. So-called additional mappings MAY be applied, such as those defined in [I-D.ietf-precis-mappings]. December 2013 4. Uppercase and titlecase characters might be mapped to their lowercase equivalents (see Section 4.2.1 below). 5. Unicode Normalization Form C (NFC) MUST be applied to all characters.
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With regard to directionality, the "Bidi Rule" provided in [RFC5893] applies.
A username MUST NOT be zero bytes in length. This rule is to be enforced after any normalization and mapping of code points.
In protocols that provide usernames as input to a cryptographic algorithm such as a hash function, the client will need to perform proper preparation of the username before applying the algorithm.
Case Mapping
Case mapping is a matter for the application protocol, protocol implementation, or end deployment. In general, this document suggests that it is preferable to perform case mapping, since not doing so can lead to false positives during authentication and authorization (as described in [RFC6943] ) and can result in confusion among end users given the prevalence of case mapping in many existing protocols and applications. However, there can be good reasons to not perform case mapping, such as backward compatibility with deployed infrastructure.
In particular:
o SASL mechanisms that directly re-use this profile MUST specify whether and when case mapping is to be applied to authentication identifiers. SASL mechanisms SHOULD delay any case mapping to the last possible moment, such as when doing a lookup by username, username comparisons, or generating a cryptographic salt from a username (if the last possible moment happens on the server, then decisions about case mapping can be a matter of deployment policy). In keeping with RFC4422, SASL mechanisms are not to apply this or any other profile to authorization identifiers. o Application protocols that use SASL (such as IMAP [RFC3501] and XMPP [RFC6120]) and that directly re-use this profile MUST specify whether case mapping is to be applied to authorization identifiers. Such "SASL application protocols" SHOULD delay any case mapping of authorization identifiers to the last possible moment, which happens to necessarily be on the server side (this enables decisions about case mapping to be a matter of deployment policy). In keeping with RFC4422, SASL application protocols are not to apply this or any other profile to authentication identifiers.
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o Application protocols that do not use SASL (such as HTTP authentication with the Basic and Digest schemes [RFC2617] ) MUST specify whether and when case mapping is to be applied to authentication identifiers and authorization identifiers. Such "non-SASL application protocols" SHOULD delay any case mapping to the last possible moment, such as when doing a lookup by username, username comparisons, or generating a cryptographic salt from a username (if the last possible moment happens on the server, then decisions about case mapping can be a matter of deployment policy).
If the specification for a SASL mechanism, SASL application protocol, or non-SASL application protocol specifies the handling of case mapping for strings that conform to the UsernameIdentifierClass, it MUST clearly describe whether case mapping is required, recommended, or optional at the level of the protocol itself, implementations thereof, or service deployments.
Examples
The following examples illustrate a small number of usernames that are consistent with the format defined above (note that the characters < and > are used here to delineate the actual usernames and are not part of the username strings). The following examples illustrate strings that are not valid usernames because they violate the format defined above. 
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+---------------------------------+---------------------------------+ | # | Username | Notes | +---------------------------------+---------------------------------+ | 1 | <juliet> | A userpart only | +---------------------------------+---------------------------------+ | 2 | <fussball@example.com> | A userpart and domainpart | +---------------------------------+---------------------------------+ | 3 | <fu&#xDF;ball@example.com> | The third character is LATIN | | | | SMALL LETTER SHARP S (U+00DF) | +---------------------------------+---------------------------------+ | 4 | <&#x3C0;@example.com> | A userpart of GREEK SMALL | | | | LETTER PI (U+03C0) | +---------------------------------+---------------------------------+ | 5 | <&#x3A3;@example.com> | A userpart of GREEK CAPITAL | | | | LETTER SIGMA (U+03A3) | +---------------------------------+---------------------------------+ | 6 | <&#x3C3;@example.com> | A userpart of GREEK SMALL | | | | LETTER SIGMA (U+03C3) | +---------------------------------+---------------------------------+ | 7 | <&#x3C2;@example.com> | A userpart of GREEK SMALL | | | | LETTER FINAL SIGMA (U+03C2) | +---------------------------------+--------------------------------
Here again, several points are worth noting. Regarding example 11, the Unicode character ROMAN NUMERAL FOUR (U+2163) has a compatibility equivalent of the string formed of LATIN CAPITAL LETTER I (U+0049) and LATIN CAPITAL LETTER V (U+0056), but characters with compatibility equivalents are not allowed in the PRECIS IdentiferClass. Regarding example 12: symbol characters such as BLACK CHESS KING (U+265A) are not allowed in the PRECIS IdentifierClass.
Passwords
Definition
This document specifies that a password is a string of Unicode code points [UNICODE], encoded using UTF-8 [RFC3629] , and conformant to the PRECIS FreeformClass.
The syntax for a password is defined as follows using the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) [RFC5234] . password = 1*(freepoint) ; ; a "freepoint" is a UTF-8 encoded ; Unicode code point that conforms to ; the PRECIS "FreeformClass" ;
All code points and blocks not explicitly allowed in the PRECIS FreeformClass are disallowed; this includes private use characters, surrogate code points, and the other code points and blocks defined as "Prohibited Output" in Section 2.3 of RFC 4013.
Preparation
A password MUST conform to the "PasswordFreeformClass" profile of the PRECIS FreeformClass, which is defined as follows:
1. The base string class is the "FreeformClass" specified in [I-D.ietf-precis-framework]. 2. Fullwidth and halfwidth characters MUST NOT be mapped to their decomposition equivalents. 3. Any instances of non-ASCII space MUST be mapped to ASCII space (U+0020). 4. So-called additional mappings MAY be applied, such as those defined in [I-D.ietf-precis-mappings]. 5. Uppercase and titlecase characters MUST NOT be mapped to their lowercase equivalents. 6. Unicode Normalization Form C (NFC) MUST be applied to all characters.
With regard to directionality, the "Bidi Rule" (defined in [RFC5893] ) and similar rules are unnecessary and inapplicable to passwords, since they can reduce the range of characters that are allowed in a string and therefore reduce the amount of entropy that is possible in a password. Furthermore, such rules are intended to minimize the possibility that the same string will be displayed differently on a system set for right-to-left display and a system set for left-toright display; however, passwords are typically not displayed at all and are rarely meant to be interoperable across different systems in the way that non-secret strings like domain names and usernames are.
A password MUST NOT be zero bytes in length. This rule is to be enforced after any normalization and mapping of code points.
In protocols that provide passwords as input to a cryptographic algorithm such as a hash function, the client will need to perform proper preparation of the password before applying the algorithm, since the password is not available to the server in plaintext form.
Examples
The following examples illustrate a small number of passwords that are consistent with the format defined above (note that the characters < and > are used here to delineate the actual passwords and are not part of the username strings). SASLprep, the use of NFKC also handled the mapping of fullwidth and halfwidth code points to their decomposition equivalents (see [I-D.ietf-precis-mappings]). Although it is expected that code points with compatibility equivalents are rare in existing passwords, some passwords that matched when SASLprep was used might no longer work when the rules in this specification are applied.
o SASLprep mapped the "characters commonly mapped to nothing" from Appendix B.1 of [RFC3454] ) to nothing, whereas the PRECIS FreeformClass entirely disallows such characters, which correspond to the code points from the "M" category defined under Section 6.13 of [I-D.ietf-precis-framework] (with the exception of U+1806 MONGOLIAN TODO SOFT HYPHEN, which was commonly mapped to nothing in Unicode 3.2 but at the time of this writing is allowed by Unicode 6.2). In practice, this change will probably have no effect on comparison, but user-oriented software might reject such code points instead of ignoring them during password preparation.
IANA Considerations
The IANA shall add the following entries to the PRECIS Profiles Registry.
UsernameIdentifierClass
